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COMMENTS

LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD—
BALANCING STUDENT-ATHLETES’ SHORTAND LONG-TERM FINANCIAL INTERESTS
WITH EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS’
INTERESTS IN AVOIDING NCAA
SANCTIONS ∗
J. G. JOAKIM SOEDERBAUM∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Johnny Manziel, the 2012 Heisman Trophy winner—who is also known as
“Johnny Football”—generated $37 million in media exposure for Texas A&M
during his first year of playing, so far injury-free, but also per National
In
Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) regulations, profit-free. 1
contrast, with only nine minutes left of a game, Alabama junior wide receiver
Tyrone Prothro, who had already caught seven balls for 134 yards and made
∗ This Comment won the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School's
2013 National Sports Law Student Writing Competition.
∗∗ Third-year student at Texas A&M University School of Law and Editor-in-Chief of the Texas
A&M Law Review. The Author would like to thank Professor of Law Frank Snyder for many
thought-provoking and inspiring conversations; Patricia J. Askew, staff attorney to Justice Bob
McCoy at the Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas, Fort Worth, for providing invaluable
feedback and perspective; fellow Texas A&M law students Jessica Theriot and Andrew Middleton for
proofreading; and the members of the National Sports Law Institute and the Marquette Sports Law
Review for this opportunity and honor.
1. Study: End of Football Season Produced $37 Million in Media Exposure for Texas A&M,
AGGIEATHLETICS.COM (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.aggieathletics.com/ViewArticle.dbml?SPSID=6
32660&SPID=93232&DB_LANG=C&DB_OEM_ID=27300&ATCLID=206020080
[hereinafter
Study]. At the time this Comment was selected for publication, Johnny Manziel was not yet eligible
to declare for the NFL draft; however, on January 8, 2014, he announced, “After long discussions
with my family, friends, teammates, and coaches, I have decided to make myself available for the
2014 NFL Draft. The decision was not an easy one.” Chase Goodbread, Johnny Manziel Announces
Decision to Enter 2014 NFL Draft, NFL.COM (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000
000310869/article/johnny-manziel-announces-decision-to-enter-2014-nfl-draft; Billy Liucci, To the
12th Man: A Personal Message from Johnny Manziel, TEXAGS (Jan. 8, 2014), http://texags.com/
Stories/12609; see infra, Parts II.C.1, III.B.2. Despite Manziel’s decision, his story—as used in this
Comment—highlights many of the current regulatory shortcomings that must be addressed.
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two touchdowns, snapped two bones when a defender crashed into him, 2
resulting in his fall from the Heisman watch list, several surgeries, two years
of rehabilitation, and no reasonable hope of returning as a professional football
player. 3
Manziel, Prothro, and other student-athletes are at the mercy of strict
NCAA regulations that favor the NCAA and its member institutions, even
though developed to protect both the institutions and the student-athletes. 4
The present system’s focus on “amateurism” is poorly designed to protect all
of the parties involved when a student-athlete’s expectations of a future sports
career can vanish in the blink of an eye—or the snap of a bone—with no real
recourse. While no rules can completely prevent horrific injuries, some
fundamental changes to current legislation and regulations would provide
student-athletes a fair opportunity to make their own decisions about their
careers and capitalize on their successes while they are physically capable of
doing so and, at the same time, protect universities facing heavy NCAA
sanctions as a result of violations, as well as prevent needless litigation.
This Comment will argue that a few changes can vastly improve the
student-athletes’ precarious situation while also protecting the educational
institutions that are subject to the NCAA’s sanctions in a straightforward fourpart solution: (1) a student-athlete should not forfeit his or her amateur status
until actually entering into an agreement with, or receiving benefits from, a
professional team; (2) the professional leagues should lift any restrictions
preventing student-athletes from signing with a professional team; (3) the
legislation governing a student-athlete’s transition from college to professional
sports should directly include the professional team; and (4) the legislation

2. Clay Travis, Tyrone Prothro, Former Alabama Star Turned Bank Teller, AOLNEWS.COM
(Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/09/30/five-years-later-ex-alabama-star-tyrone-pro
thro-is-cashing-chec/.
3. Jason Galloway, Prothro Still Believes, CRIMSON WHITE (Sept. 30, 2010), http://cw.ua.edu/
2010/09/30/prothro-still-believes/; Travis, supra note 2; see also infra Part II.D. (discussing the
already limited chance for a college player to reach the professional leagues). Five years later, the
twenty-six-year-old former college football star-turned-bank teller still hoped to play football again,
however unlikely that dream might be. See Galloway, supra.
4. Richard Salgado, A Fiduciary Duty to Teach Those Who Don’t Want to Learn: The Potentially
Dangerous Oxymoron of “College Sports,” 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 135, 147–48
(2007); see also W.J. TAUZIN, COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 108-24, pt. 1, at 1–2
(2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1016, 1017; Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of
the UAAA and SPARTA: How America Should Reform Its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True
Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 172–74 (2013); Lloyd Zane Remick &
Christopher Joseph Cabott, Keeping out the Little Guy: An Older Contract Advisor’s Concern, a
Younger Contract Advisor’s Lament, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (2005); Diane Sudia & Rob
Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millennium: State Statutes and the Uniform Athlete
Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 279 (2001).
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should impose a duty upon the professional team to report to the educational
institution when one of the institution’s athletes, or his or her representative,
communicates with the team. Collectively, these changes would create a more
balanced system that fosters compliance and, consequently, decreases the need
for enforcement and the often-resulting litigation.5
II. MAIN PARTIES
On December 28, 1905, sixty-two educational institutions formed the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) to “protect
young people from the dangerous and exploitive athletics practices of the
time.” 6 In 1910, the IAAUS became the NCAA. 7 As intercollegiate sports
grew more popular, the NCAA, in 1948, established guidelines for recruiting
and financial aid8 and later developed restrictions on student-athletes and
educational institutions 9 before it transformed into the multi-billion dollar
franchise that exists today. 10
In contrast to the development of student leagues on university campuses,
characterized by voluntary, unpaid participation, professional sports ultimately
became characterized by the payment of athletes for performance11 and their
5. See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
6. History: Pre-1950, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About
+the+NCAA/History (last updated August 13, 2012). The first intercollegiate football game took
place in 1869 between Rutgers and Princeton. Early football, circa 1869, differed vastly from today’s
football: due to the game’s physical character and minimal protective equipment, players suffered
“wrenched spinal cords, crushed skulls and broken ribs that pierced their hearts.” Christopher Klein,
How Teddy Roosevelt Saved Football, HIST. HEADLINES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.history.com/
news/how-teddy-roosevelt-saved-football; Dan Jenkins, The First 100 Years, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Sept. 15, 1969, at 46, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG11466
46/index.htm. In 1904, there were eighteen recorded football deaths and 159 serious injuries,
followed by 19 deaths and 137 serious injuries in 1905. Klein, supra.
7. History: Pre-1950, supra note 6.
8. Chronology of Enforcement, NCAA.ORG, http://archive.is/Ea1B (last updated Mar. 21, 2011).
The NCAA had a “high standard of personal honor, eligibility and fair play” and a strong
commitment to amateurism. Id. Originally allowing the member institutions to be self-regulatory
created a conflict of interest and, in 1948, the NCAA adopted the “Sanity Code,” which strictly
regulated financial aid, recruiting, academic standards, institutional control, and amateurism. Id. The
Sanity Code was repealed in 1951 due to concerns with the limits on financial aid, recruiting, and the
severe consequences for violations. Id. In 1952, the NCAA adopted a new code, which then kept
developing into the 2000s. Id.
9. History Pre-1950, supra note 6.
10. See infra Parts II.A.–B.; Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES
(Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2011/12/22/college-footballs-most-valuableteams/.
11. Compare Chronology of Enforcement, supra note 8 (emphasizing the “pure” amateur
characteristics of collegiate sports), with Peter Morris, From First Baseman to Primo Basso: The Odd
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concomitant need for representation by agents in negotiating with team
owners. 12 As collegiate and professional sports grew, the primary parties
relevant to student-athletes’ transition between the two became the NCAA, the
NCAA member institution, the agent, and sometimes a legal team. 13
A. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
As a private organization, the NCAA has authority to regulate only its
member institutions and its student-athletes. 14 The NCAA’s stated goal and
fundamental purpose is to make a clear distinction between professional sports
and intercollegiate sports by enforcing the “amateur” nature of intercollegiate
sports. 15 The NCAA oversees eighty-nine national championships covering
Saga of the Original Pirate King (Tra La!), 15 NINE: J. BASEBALL HIST. & CULTURE, 46, 48 (2007)
(explaining how money soon became a regular part of professional sports). In 1859, the Excelsior
Club of Brooklyn paid baseball pitcher James “Jim” Creighton, one of the first professional athletes in
America, $500 per year to sign with the team. Morris, supra, at 48; Early Baseball Milestones:
1860.7, MLB.COM: BASEBALL MEMORY LAB, http://mlb.mlb.com/memorylab/chronology/index.jsp?
start=1826&end=1870 (last updated Mar. 12, 2012). Other teams soon followed Excelsior’s example,
and players wanted their share of the money team owners made from the games. Bob Liff, New Field
and New Dreams Borough Has Rich Tradition, NY DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2000), http://www.ny
dailynews.com/archives/boroughs/new-field-new-dreams-borough-rich-tradition-article-1.883241. In
1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings was the first team to openly admit that it paid all of its players.
Id.
12. See Edelman, supra note 4, at 151–52. The first recorded case of outside representation dates
back to 1925, when Charles Pyle, representing football running back Harold “Red” Grange,
negotiated a contract with the Chicago Bears worth close to $10,000 per game—plus a potential
bonus based on an increase in the Bears’ game attendance. Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker,
Collectively Bargained Age/Education Requirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports ClubOwners or Labor Risk for Players Unions?, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 344 n.26 (2010). Not until
the late 1960s, when the players gained leverage by unionizing and increased complexity to
collectively negotiated agreements, did the role of the agent rapidly grow in importance. Symposium:
The Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 345, 355 (2003) [hereinafter
Symposium].
13. See Symposium, supra note 12, at 368. Of course, other parties, such as state and federal
government and professional player associations, coaches, alumni, and supporting booster clubs, may
have individual and more attenuated interests in the regulation of student-athletes, but this Comment
will focus solely on the parties directly involved in a college athlete taking the step from collegiate
athletics to professional sports. See Damon Moore, Proposals for Reform to Agent Regulations, 59
DRAKE L. REV. 517, 526–28 (2011); Symposium, supra note 12, at 368.
14. Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and Unintended
Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 806–07 (2006) [hereinafter Davis, Regulating the
Athlete-Agent Industry].
15. See 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 1.2–1.3 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]
(“Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be
motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”). Although each of the
three available NCAA divisions “creates its own rules governing personnel, amateurism, recruiting,
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twenty-three sports and governs more than 430,000 student-athletes competing
in three divisions at more than 1,000 colleges and universities. 16
While allowing student-athletes to negotiate with professional teams, 17 the
NCAA has implemented regulations that render student-athletes ineligible for
future participation in intercollegiate play after agreeing to be represented by
an athletic agent or accepting gifts from an agent, based on the notion that
doing so would violate its principle of amateurism. 18 Ultimately, the NCAA
regulations render student-athletes ineligible if they accept benefits from
“[a]ny person who represents any individual in the marketing of his or her
athletics ability . . . or [a]n agent, even if the agent has indicated that he or she
has no interest in representing the student-athlete . . . .” 19 Underlying the
regulations is the presumption that any benefits received by student-athletes
are based on athletic ability and therefore unavailable to the general student
body. 20
To identify the limits to paying student-athletes that are necessary for the
college sports model to succeed, the NCAA defines “pay” as “the receipt of
funds, awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the
Association for participation in athletics.”21 The NCAA may also render “a
student-athlete ineligible if the [student-athlete’s] family or friends accept
benefits from the agent.” 22 The regulations also allow the NCAA to impose
severe penalties on its member institutions for playing an ineligible athlete,
including vacated wins and revenue forfeitures.23
eligibility, benefits, financial aid, and playing and practice seasons – consistent with the overall
governing principles of the Association,” this Comment focuses on the NCAA’s overall governing
principle of amateurism and how it is portrayed in Division I. About the NCAA, NCAA.ORG, http://
www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Membership+NEW (last updated
Aug. 13, 2012).
16. About the NCAA, supra note 15.
17. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.2.4.3 (“[T]he individual, his or her legal
guardians or the institution’s professional sports counseling panel may enter into negotiations with a
professional sports organization without the loss of the individual’s amateur status.”).
18. Sudia & Remis, supra note 4, at 268–69; R. Alexander Payne, Note, Rebuilding the Prevent
Defense: Why Unethical Agents Continue to Score and What Can Be Done to Change the Game, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 657, 662 (2011). The NCAA renders ineligible a student-athlete who
“ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his
or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport.” NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.1.
19. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.1.2.
20. See id. art. 12.3.1.2(a).
21. Id. art. 12.02.7.
22. Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry, supra note 14, at 806.
23. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.1, 19.9.5–19.9.8. In 2010, the NCAA imposed
postseason bans, vacated wins, scholarship reductions, revenue forfeitures, and probation on the
University of Southern California following then student-athletes Reggie Bush and O.J. Mayo
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The scope of the regulations is broad: all agent contracts presumably apply
to all sports in which a student-athlete participates and therefore cause a loss
of remaining eligibility in all of those sports unless otherwise clearly stated in
the contract. 24 The regulations also cover agreements regarding future
representation, including by lawyers with regard to contract negotiations.25
An exception to the rule allows student-athletes to retain an advisor to the
extent that the advisor does not in any form represent the student-athlete in, or
is present during, the negotiations. 26 These regulations create a situation in
which student-athletes and their guardians may interact and even negotiate
with professional teams on their own without risk losing any remaining
eligibility, but without any professional guidance during the actual
negotiations. 27 The regulations also allow NCAA member institutions to
establish a professional sports counseling panel to aid student-athletes by
providing traditional agent functions, and NCAA head coaches may perform
many of the same services as long as the coach follows the NCAA’s reporting
requirements and receives no compensation from an agent for the services.28
The NCAA’s approach to defining amateurism does not address the core
issue, “which is to identify the limits to paying student-athletes that are
necessary for the college sports model to succeed.”29 The “college sports

interactions with athlete agents. Payne, supra note 18, at 659.
24. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.1.
25. See id. art. 12.3.1.1.
26. Id. art. 12.3.2 (allowing student-athletes to secure advice from a lawyer concerning a
proposed professional contract, provided that the lawyer does not actually represent the studentathlete in the negotiations); id. art. 12.3.2.1 (having a lawyer present during the discussion of a
contract offer with a professional sports organization is considered agent representation).
27. Id. art. 12.3.2; Payne, supra note 18, at 663.
28. NCAA MANUAL, supra, note 15, art. 11.1.3.1, 12.3.4.
29. Jon Solomon, Expert Report in Ed O'Bannon Lawsuit Argues NCAA Members Engage in
'Price Collusion,’ AL.COM (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2012/10/expert_report
_in_ed_obannon_la.html [hereinafter Solomon, Expert Report in Ed O'Bannon Lawsuit] (quoting
Stanford University economics professor emeritus Robert Noll); see also NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 15, art. 1.3 (“A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by
so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports.”). In September 2013, Electronic Arts Sports and Collegiate Licensing Company settled all
claims over the use of college athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, but the remaining defendant,
the NCAA, announced that it was not interested in a compromise and would not hesitate to fight the
matter all the way to the United States Supreme Court to defend its product. See Jon Solomon, EA
Sports and CLC Settle Lawsuit by Ed O’Bannon Plaintiffs; NCAA Remains as Lone Defendant,
AL.COM, http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/09/ea_will_not_make_college_footb.html (last
updated Sept. 28, 2013) (quoting plaintiff’s lead attorney Michael Hausfeld, “The NCAA has never
made any indication that they are intent on doing anything other than taking their association over the
cliff if necessary.”).
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model” requires a player to be a student first and athlete second, 30 despite the
individual physical risks that a student-athlete takes. 31 And it appears safe to
say that the model is broken, at least from the spectator’s perspective. For
example, “despite fans knowing Ohio State players violated NCAA rules and
were playing in the game after receiving impermissible benefits, the Sugar
Bowl drew twenty-five percent more viewers than the previous year.” 32 The
violations of rules deemed necessary to secure success for the college sports
model “[did] not appear to have had any effect on the demand for this
game.” 33 In contrast, the strict NCAA definition of amateurism appears to
restrict student-athletes’ opportunities more than those of regular students and
declares students entering into agreements with agents ineligible for purposes
of athletic participation. 34 Because the current rules are so strict, many
student-athletes, particularly those who come from poor economic conditions,
feel forced to accept or even solicit benefits from agents.35 Additionally,
several student-athletes have chosen to challenge the NCAA’s strict
regulations and eligibility requirements in court. 36
B. The NCAA Member Institution
Over 1,200 educational institutions hold some form of membership with
the NCAA, which, as introduced above, places many restrictions on its
member institutions and their student-athletes. 37 Many factors can motivate a
university to field athletic teams and, consequently, to agree to comply with
NCAA regulations. High-visibility athletic programs may increase the
university’s reputation, and successful athletic programs may increase a
university’s popularity among applicants, allowing the university to be more
30. Remaining Eligible, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Eligi
bility/Remaining+Eligible/Amateurism (last updated May 31, 2012) (“In the collegiate model of
sports, the young men and women competing on the field or court are students first, athletes
second.”).
31. See Travis, supra note 2.
32. Solomon, Expert Report in Ed O'Bannon Lawsuit, supra note 29. Six Ohio State players
were found to have violated NCAA rules by selling championship rings, jerseys and trinkets for
reduced prices on tattoos and money. The NCAA suspended the players for the start of the 2011
season rather than immediately for the Sugar Bowl that ended the 2010 season. Id.
33. Id.
34. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.1.
35. Payne, supra note 18, at 687; see also Josh Luchs: States Must Enforce Laws, ESPN, http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5681002 (last updated Oct. 13, 2010) (describing how sports
agent Josh Luchs gave student-athletes money for food).
36. See infra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
37. See 2008–09 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 4–5 (2009); Enforcement, NCAA.ORG, http://ww
w.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/enforcement/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).

SOEDERBAUM COMMENT FORMATTED FINAL

268

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

2/3/2014 11:00 AM

[Vol. 24:1

selective in admissions.38 Further, popular and successful athletic programs
generate significant revenue. 39 For example, The University of Texas football
team ranks as college football’s most valuable team, with a 2011 value of
$129 million. 40 Overall, the twenty highest-ranked teams had an average
value of $83 million, up from $68 million in 2007. 41 The increase is largely
due to multi-million dollar TV-rights agreements. 42
The NCAA can sanction a member institution through fines, suspensions,
forfeiture, or restrictions if it finds that the institution has violated NCAA
regulations. 43 However, because the success of a university’s former players
who became professional athletes may affect its ability to recruit new studentathletes, 44 many universities, rather than isolating their student-athletes from
agents, have enacted specific guidelines to exert varying degrees of control
over student-agent contact. 45 Such guidelines may consist of requirements
that an agent provide the university’s compliance office with all materials the
agent sends to the student-athlete; that the agent schedule meetings with a
38. Moore, supra note 13, at 524.
39. Id.; see infra notes 167–171 and accompanying text.
40. Smith, supra note 10. The University of Texas had a football profit of $71 million for the
2010 season despite not making a bowl game and, thus, missing out on up to an additional $22.3
million. Id.; Chris Greenberg & Chris Spurlock, Bowl Game Payouts Map: Money Earned in 2011–
2012 BCS and Other Football Bowls (INFOGRAPHIC), HUFFPOST SPORTS, http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/12/29/bowl-game-payouts-map-2011-2012-bcs_n_1174808.html (last updated Aug. 7,
2012). Its football program generated $96 million in revenue. Smith, supra note 10. In addition, The
University of Texas landed a landmark twenty-year deal, worth a total of $300 million, to launch a
cable channel with Disney-owned ESPN and IMG College. Id.
41. Smith, supra note 10. In 1994, colleges generated $2.5 billion in retail sales of merchandise
bearing their names, logos, and mascots; and many of the most successful college athletics programs
entered into multi-million dollar deals with major apparel manufacturers such as Nike and Reebok.
Timothy Davis, African-American Student Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure?,
6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 214–15 (1996) [hereinafter Davis, Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory
Structure].
42. Smith, supra note 10. TV-rights agreements provided an average revenue growth of $6
million per team over the last two seasons. Id. ESPN annually pays $60 million to the Big 12 and
$10 million to the Big Ten for first-tier TV rights. Id. In 2008, CBS and the SEC agreed to a deal
worth approximately $825 million over fifteen years. Id. In 2011, FOX and the Big 12 revealed a
new thirteen-year cable deal worth $1.17 billion over the length of the agreement. Id. Also in 2011,
the Pac-12 agreed to terms with both ESPN and FOX to establish the richest media rights deal in
college sports—the contract is worth $225 million per annum for twelve years. Id. The NCAA will
be paid nearly $11 billion over fourteen years just for the TV rights to March Madness. Ben
Steverman et al., The Real Cost of March Madness, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.bloom
berg.com/consumer-spending/2012-03-21/the-real-cost-of-march-madness.html#slide10. The NCAA
then distributes money to its member institutions. The NCAA Budget: Where the Money Goes,
NCAA.ORG (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/ncaa-budget-where-money-goes.
43. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.9.
44. Moore, supra note 13, at 544.
45. Id.
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student-athlete through the head coach; that a member of the student-athlete’s
coaching staff is present during any meeting; and that agents may meet with
student-athletes only on certain days or during designated windows during the
spring semester. 46
C. Professional Leagues and Agents
1. The Professional Leagues
For purposes of this Comment, the most relevant professional leagues are
the National Football League (NFL), 47 the National Basketball Association
(NBA), 48 and Major League Baseball (MLB), 49 which collectively generated
over $19 billion in revenues in the 2011–2012 season—despite the NBA
season being shortened due to a labor dispute. 50 Similar to the NCAA, these
organizations also place restrictions on student-athletes, some of which
generate litigation. 51
The NFL requires an athlete to be either out of high school for three years
or to have finished at least three college football seasons before entering the
league, 52 aiming to protect:
1. Players who are less physically and psychologically
mature from heightened risk of injury;
2. The NFL’s entertainment product from the negative
consequences associated with such injuries;
3. The NFL teams from costs and liability associated with
such injuries; and
4. Young players from self-abuse 53 in an attempt to reach
the NFL early. 54
NFL regulations allow teams to sign players to their practice squads, 55 but a
46. Id. at 544–46.
47. NFL, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
48. NBA, NBA.COM http://www.nba.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
49. MLB, MLB.COM http://mlb.mlb.com/home (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
50. Sports Industry Overview, PLUNKETT RES., http://www.plunkettresearch.com/sports-recreat
ion-leisure-market-research/industry-statistics (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
51. See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
52. National Football League Eligibility Rules, NFL REGIONAL COMBINES, https://www.nfl
regionalcombines.com/Docs/Eligibility%20rules.pdf. (last visited Dec. 18, 2013)
53. Namely, overtraining and steroid use. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev’d, 369 F.3d 124, 125–26 (2nd Cir. 2004).
54. Id.; see infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.
55. NFL, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 33, § 1(a) (2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA].
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player has to satisfy the fundamental draft requirements to qualify. 56 In 2003,
after having been suspended by the university for accepting extra benefits,57
then-Ohio State running back Maurice Clarett challenged the NFL eligibility
rules on antitrust grounds. 58 The Second Circuit noted that it was undisputed
that Clarett was “an accomplished and talented amateur football player” 59 and
held in favor of the NFL, stating, “[t]his lawsuit reflects simply a prospective
employee’s disagreement with the criteria, established by the employer and the
labor union, that he must meet in order to be considered for employment.” 60
Other sports have less strenuous restrictions on players’ draft eligibility.61
For example, the NBA requires an athlete to be at least nineteen-years-old and
to be at least one year removed from high school before the athlete may enter
the draft. 62 The MLB rules are even more lenient; players do not actively
enter the draft. 63 Rather, high school graduates who have not yet attended
college and college players who have completed their junior year or turned
twenty-one are eligible to be drafted by a MLB team in the yearly draft.64
2. Agents
Often labeled as “the bad guy,” 65 agents are familiar with the numbers
discussed above and have experience in exploring the choices and leverage
available to the student-athletes. 66 Student-athletes work with agents to bridge
the gap in contract negotiation expertise between the athlete and a professional

56. Id. art. 6, § 2(d).
57. Mike Freeman, Football; Buckeyes Suspend Clarett for Year, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2003),
http://www .nytimes.com/2003/09/11/sports/football-buckeyes-suspend-clarett-for-year.html.
58. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125.
59. Id. at 126, n.2 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 143.
61. See NBA & NBPA, CBA 101: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2011 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (NBA) AND THE NATIONAL
BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (NBPA) 25 (2012) [hereinafter NBA CBA 101]; First-Year
Player Draft: Official Rules, MLB.COM: EVENTS, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last
updated May 14, 2013).
62. NBA CBA 101, supra note 61, at 25; see also Salgado, supra note 4, at 146.
63. See First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, supra note 61; Robert Rosner, NCAA’s Stance on
MLB Draft Is Its Best Towards the Big Three, SEBASTIAN’S CORNER (June 21, 2011, 10:00 AM),
http://umesls.tumblr.com/post/6755412125/ncaas-stance-on-mlb-draft-is-its-best-towards-the-big.
64. First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, supra note 61.
65. See generally Symposium, supra note 12, at 346 (referring to legislation designed to protect
“the welfare of both student athletes and academic institutions by policing the activities of athlete
agents”).
66. Id. at 355.
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club. 67 The athlete-agent market has grown increasingly competitive due to
an increase in the number of agents,68 an increase in professional player
salaries, 69 and industry consolidation. 70 Given the many agents competing to
represent a limited number of athletes and the earning potential for those
agents who land clients, unethical, or even illegal, conduct has become more
common. 71 In an attempt to provide better protection for student-athletes and
universities, many states began enacting legislation to govern the actions of
athlete agents,72 but many of these statutes, which were rarely enforced,
67. Id.
68. Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry, supra note 14, at 793. For example, in 2006,
there were 350 agents and 400 players in the NBA; 150 agents and 700 players in the NHL; 900
agents and 1,900 players in the NFL; and 300 agents and 1,200 players in the MLB. Id. An NFL
study showed that by 2003, 50% of the agents had no clients, and a 2006 estimate suggests that less
than 10% of the NFL agents can make a living solely from agent representation. Id. at 794.
69. Id. at 794. Television contracts, merchandising, and union-negotiated favorable minimum
salaries have led to a significant increase in player salaries. Id. In 1983, the number one NFL-draft
pick, John Elway, received a $1 million signing bonus. Id. In 2004, the number-one pick, Carson
Palmer, received $10 million. Id. at 795. As a direct result of the increasing player salaries, the
potential earnings for an agent have greatly increased. Id. at 796. In 2005, the NFL, NBA, NHL, and
MLB players earned a total of $7.685 billion, of which agents received $385 million. Id. at 797.
70. Id. at 799. As the athlete-agent industry has become part of the larger entertainment industry,
the potential services provided by agents have increased both in number and complexity. Id. at 791.
As athletes identify the particular services required—generally, well beyond the scope of negotiating
a contract—many of them now look to work with more than one agent. Id. at 792. Today, typical
agent functions include: contract negotiations; medical-needs assessment; career counseling, legal
consultation; post-career planning; money management; and off-the-field counseling. Walter T.
Champion, Jr., Attorneys Qua Sports Agents: An Ethical Conundrum, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 349,
351–52 (1997) (“Regarding money management, the measure of success for an agent should be the
athlete's financial security at retirement.”).
71. Edelman, supra note 4, at 152–54; see also Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry,
supra note 14, at 801. Some agents would more or less do anything to gain an advantage, including
offering money to induce amateur athletes to secure clients and a better cut of any professional
earnings the athlete may collect down the road. Edelman, supra note 4, at 153. Others have
prioritized their own cut before the athlete’s terms, negotiated with teams in which the agent had a
direct financial interest, or even served as the president for the team with which the athlete was
negotiating. See Brown v. Woolf, 554 F. Supp. 1206, 1207 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (agent negotiated down
player’s benefits but retained his own full portion); see also Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F.
Supp. 542, 546 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (agent did not follow common practices because agent wanted
player to sign with the team he owned).
72. Because of the increasing unethical behavior, ethical sports agents and NCAA were
proponents of statutory law governing the sports agents. The drafting of the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act (UAAA) began in 1996 at the urging of Florida State University president Sandy D’Alemberte.
Symposium, supra note 12, at 359. Several of the seventeen drafters on the committee had direct ties
to the NCAA; none of the committee members were professional athletes or recent college athletes.
Id. at 360; Edelman, supra note 4, at 168–69. The sports agents recognized a need to stop the
downward ethical spiral, and the NCAA recognized an opportunity to curtail payments between
agents and student-athletes in violation of NCAA’s principle of amateurism. Edelman, supra note 4,
at 166–67.
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conflicted with NCAA regulations. 73 For example, by completely prohibiting
agents and student-athletes from interacting with each other, some state
statutes removed the few protections for student-athletes actually provided by
the NCAA bylaws. 74 Nonetheless, by 2001, twenty-six states 75 had
individually legislated civil and criminal penalties for athlete-agent
misconduct; eleven classified some of the misconduct as a felony. 76
73. Payne, supra note 18, at 666–67.
74. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 12.3.2. Relationships between student-athletes and
agents or educational institutions were originally covered by the statutes and common law of agency
and contract in each state. John A. Gray, Sports Agent’s Liability After SPARTA?, 6 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 141, 143–44 (2006); see, e.g., Dishman v. Jones, No. 2002-05380, 2003 WL 25466262
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 2003) (awarding professional player $396,000 plus interest against agent and
financial advisor). Before present legislation, NCAA member institutions looked to recover against
agents under the theory of tortious interference with contractual relations. See Moore, supra note 13,
at 537 (citing Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1991)). When any
form of contractual agreement exists between a student-athlete and an educational institution, courts
will presume that an agent is aware of the agreement, its terms, and any NCAA restrictions placed on
the student-athlete, and any intentional action by the agent—such as offering a contract or a benefit—
becomes a direct cause of any resulting ineligibility and consequential penalties against the
institution. See Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that
student-athlete breached contract with university when not complying with the training rules or
physical eligibility requirements); Williams v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 752 N.E.2d 367, 375 (Ohio Ct. Cl.
2001) (holding that basketball player who signed a national letter of intent entered into a contract with
the university and later violated the contract by failing to remain academically eligible); Payne, supra
note 18, at 665. The problem with recovery in the rare civil actions brought against agents by
student-athletes was that NCAA student-athletes are expected to know and adhere to the NCAA
regulations, and the more-or-less automatic contributory negligence by the student-athlete could both
mitigate the agent’s liability and reduce any potential damages. Id. at 664; see, e.g., IND. CODE. § 3451-2-6(a) (2013) (“[T]he claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant's contributory fault is
greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages.”).
Criminal laws also did not deter illegal conduct. Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why
Current Federal and State Efforts Do Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National
Licensing System May Cure the Problem, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225, 1237 (2004); see also United
States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993). In Walters, a sports agent recruited student-athletes
to enter into agreements with him for future representation in exchange for immediate benefits, postdating the agreements to avoid interfering with the student-athletes’ NCAA eligibility so that the
student-athletes could continue to receive scholarships. Id. at 1221. After fifty-six of the fifty-eight
student-athletes solicited in this manner later signed with other agents, the agent resorted to threats to
collect his money. Id. He and his partner were charged with conspiracy, RICO violations, and fraud.
Id. The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that the prosecution failed to prove fraud and reversed the
initial conviction. Id. at 1221, 1227.
75. Specifically, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Texas. Sudia & Remis, supra note 4, at 271–72 & n.32.
76. Id. The classifications differed widely from state to state, with eleven states classifying all or
some agent misconduct as felonies, and twenty states classifying all or some agent misconduct as
misdemeanors. Id. at 272–73. The typical state legislation covered at least the following aspects of
athlete agent business: (1) restrictions on the agent’s license; (2) posting and forfeiture of surety
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Forty states ultimately adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA),
which encourages agents to voluntarily comply with registration, written
agency agreements, and other requirements; outlines criminal and
administrative penalties; and creates a civil remedy that provides NCAA
member schools penalized for conduct arising from an agent’s or a studentathlete’s violation of the UAAA with a civil cause of action against both the
agent and the student-athlete. 77 The UAAA turns the NCAA’s private
principles of amateurism into law by imposing requirements that pertain to the
NCAA rules. 78 In 2004, Congress enacted the Sports Agents Responsibility
and Trust Act (SPARTA), which is very similar to UAAA in many aspects
and provides educational institutions with a federal cause of action against
agents whose SPARTA violations result in institutional expenses arising from
NCAA-imposed penalties. 79 Notwithstanding these statutes, legislative
attempts to regulate agent behavior have largely been unsuccessful, 80 and
although widely adopted among the states, the UAAA has been frequently
criticized for subordinating the interests of student-athletes to those of the
NCAA member institutions. 81

bonds or malpractice insurance; (3) legal validity of the agent contract and the athlete’s ability to
rescind the contract; (4) forfeiture of the agent’s right to repayment of items paid on behalf of the
athlete; (5) refunds of monies paid to the agent by the athlete or on her behalf; (6) civil and
administrative fines; (7) civil causes of action against the agent by the athlete, university, state, or
other injured person or business; and (8) criminal fines or imprisonment. Id. at 274.
77. ADAM EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 11, 11–12 (2013); Sudia & Remis, supra note 4, at 267, 279;
see also UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT §§ 5, 10(b)–(c), 11, 15, 17 (2000) (requiring both agent and
student-athlete to communicate any NCAA-violating agreement to the student-athlete’s institution).
78. Edelman, supra note 4, at 172; Alan Scher Zagier, Laws on Sports Agents Rarely Enforced,
HUFFPOST C. (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/laws-on-sports-agentsrar_
n_685000.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
79. See Sports Agency Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–08 (2012);
JAMES SENSENBRENNER, H.R. REP. NO. 108-24, pt. 2, at 4 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N
1021, 1022. With much of its language remarkably similar to that of the UAAA, SPARTA has been
criticized on many of the same grounds, including failing to provide a civil cause of action for
student-athletes who are harmed by their agents; but, at least SPARTA—unlike the UAAA—does not
grant a civil cause of action to NCAA member institutions against their own student-athletes.
Edelman, supra note 4, at 177–79; see Remick & Cabott, supra note 4, at 12.
80. Edelman, supra note 4, at 24–26. Several factors contribute to this lack of enforcement: (1)
lack of resources; (2) sports-agent issues are not a prosecutorial priority; (3) the NCAA is largely a
passive enforcement body relying on information presented to it; (4) because of potential NCAA
investigations or sanctions and the risk of being tagged with constructive knowledge, the NCAA
member institutions are reluctant to investigate agents; (5) any potential damages award—supposed to
make up for sanctions implemented by the NCAA—is financially unlikely to be recovered from an
individual agent; and (6) an NCAA member institution would risk severe damage to its reputation if it
brought suit against a current or former student-athlete. Id.; Willenbacher, supra note 74, at 1246–47.
81. Edelman, supra note 4, at 171–72, 179.
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D. The Student-Athlete
While some student-athletes accept athletic scholarships to obtain a
university education, many are driven by the fact that playing sports at the
collegiate level is virtually a requirement to play professionally. 82 Both
football players and men’s basketball players “identify themselves more
strongly as athletes than as students . . . [and give] more weight in choosing [a]
college to athletics than to academics.”83 In 2011, 84 the graduation rates
(given six years to complete the degree) for football and basketball players
were 16% and 25% below the college average, respectively. 85
College is often a necessary piece of the professional athletics puzzle86
since, as set out above, 87 the NFL requires an athlete to be either out of high
school for three years or to have finished at least three college football seasons
before entering the league, 88 and the NBA sets out similar requirements.89 As
a result, student-athletes must place their chances to make it to the professional
level in the hands of their coaches and educational institutions.90 And despite
the stepping stone that college provides, less than 2% of NCAA football and
basketball players actually make it from NCAA to professional sports.91
82. Former professional football player Michael Strahan stated in an interview, “Most guys in
college . . . major in sports because they’ve been told since they were kid [sic], you’re going to be a
professional athlete.” Symposium, supra note 12, at 368. Former professional football and baseball
player Deion Sanders, when asked while playing football for Florida State whether he wanted to be in
college, answered: “No, but I have to be.” Moore, supra note 13, at 520.
83. Gary Gutting, The Myth of the ‘Student-Athlete,’ NYTIMES.COM (Mar. 15, 2012, 8:30 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/the-myth-of-the-student-athlete/.
84. The NCAA also released a report on graduation rates in 2012, but that report does not include
the matched-gender ethnicity data breakdown by sport; but both the 2011 and the 2012 reports
suggest that the overall student-athlete graduation rate was 65%. Compare NCAA RESEARCH,
TRENDS IN GRADUATION-SUCCESS RATES AND FEDERAL GRADUATION RATES AT NCAA DIVISION I
INSTITUTIONS 44 (2012), with NCAA RESEARCH, TRENDS IN GRADUATION-SUCCESS RATES AND
FEDERAL GRADUATION RATES AT NCAA DIVISION I INSTITUTIONS 23 (2011).
85. Gutting, supra note 83.
86. Salgado, supra note 4, at 146.
87. See supra Part II.C.1.
88. National Football League Eligibility Rules, supra note 52 (allowing athletes to apply for
special eligibility following beginning and completion of the third NFL season after the athlete’s
high-school graduation).
89. NBA CBA 101, supra note 61; see also Salgado, supra note 4, at 146.
90. Salgado, supra note 4, at 146.
91. Id. at 145. The number of NCAA student-athletes going professional, with the exception of
baseball, is low across the different sports, per a September 2012 NCAA study, which suggests the
following percentage of NCAA athletes taking the step from NCAA to professional sports: men’s
basketball: 1.3%, women’s basketball: 0.9%, football: 1.6%, baseball: 9.7%, men’s ice hockey: 1.2%,
men’s soccer: 0.7%. NCAA RESEARCH, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF COMPETING IN ATHLETICS
BEYOND THE HIGH SCHOOL INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL (2012), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
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Further, many of these young student-athletes are unsophisticated92 and,
for some, the socio-economic profile adds to their vulnerability. 93 For
example, many student-athletes come from financially disadvantaged and
substantially poorer backgrounds than the general college population. 94 For a
vast majority of these college athletes, however, sports remain a dead end
instead of an escape from life in poverty, 95 and the average “full scholarship”
Division I athlete has to pay $2,951 annually for school-related expenses that
are not covered by scholarships and grants. 96 Several former student-athletes
have admitted to receiving money in violation of NCAA regulations because
their scholarships were insufficient to cover rent and food. 97
Many of the student-athletes who graduate but do not go professional98
have been led “to believe the hours of training . . . and teamwork is more
beneficial than any internship or job experience.” 99 They lack professional
wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs/2012/estimated+probability+of+competing+in+athletics+beyond+the+
high+school+interscholastic+level. The numbers are estimations of how many college athletes will
be drafted by the professional leagues; a statistical breakdown suggests that the chance to play Major
League baseball drops steeply in proportion to the draft round: first round, 66% chance; second
round, 49% chance; third to fifth round, 32% chance; sixth to tenth round, 20%; eleventh to twentieth
round, 11%; twenty-first round, 7%. Mike Rosenbaum, Examining the Percentage of MLB Draft
Picks Who Reach the Major Leagues, BLEACHER REP. (June 12, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/1219356-examining-the-percentage-of-mlb-draft-picks-that-reach-the-major-leagues.
92. Salgado, supra note 4, at 144. Because the areas of the brain concerned with self-regulation
and goal setting keep developing well into the twenties, student-athletes are highly susceptible to
stimuli and stressful situations and are consequently vulnerable in such situations. See Geoffrey
Rapp, The Brain of the College Athlete, 8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 153–54
(2012).
93. Salgado, supra note 4, at 145.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Associated Press, Study: ‘Free Ride’ Still Costs Athletes, ESPN (Oct. 26, 2010), http://sports.
espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5728653.
97. George Dohrmann, Confessions of an Agent, SI.COM (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/magazine/10/12/agent/index.html. However, roughly two-thirds
of the class of 2010 (athletes and non-athletes included) took loans for college and owed an average
of $25,250 upon graduation, suggesting that the “full scholarship” athletes are far from disadvantaged
compared to their fellow students. Justin Pope, Average Student Loan Debt: $25,250, HUFFPOST C.
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/03/average-student-debt-2525_n_10733
35.html. Other studies suggest that 72% of college athletes expect to owe student loan debt when
they graduate—numbers aligning surprisingly well with the roughly two thirds of the class of 2010
graduating with student loans. See id.; Stacy A. Teicher, College Athletes Tackle Their Financial
Future, CSMONITOR.COM (Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1003/p13s02-legn.html.
98. Recent NCAA numbers suggest that basketball and football players graduate at a rate of 74%
and 70%, respectively. Erik Christianson, DI Men’s Basketball, FBS Football Graduation Rates
Highest Ever, NCAA.COM (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-10-25/dimens-basketball-fbs-football-graduation-rates-highest-ever.
99. Stephanie Stark, College Athletes Suffer the Greatest Injustice from NCAA, USA TODAY C.
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experience and have comparatively little knowledge about their chosen fields
of study upon graduation. 100 Chris Davis, an Ohio University graduate with a
3.6 GPA, a pre-medical degree, and leadership experience as the head of his
Division I cross country team, graduated without connections and experience
in his field. 101 Now, he is behind his non-athletic peers when it comes to
career preparation, college’s ultimate purpose, stating, “I didn’t do the
volunteering because I didn’t have the time focusing on athletics. I didn’t do
them and they’re essential to get a job or get into grad school.”102 Despite the
many hurdles, however, 36% of student-athletes expect to become
millionaires.103
III. REGULATIONS AND THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES
While a student-athlete voluntarily accepts an athletic scholarship, the
relationship between a student-athlete and the program is considerably less
voluntary than it appears.104 Student-athletes must place their faith in the
institution and its coach, who decides which players get the opportunity,
exposure, renewed scholarships, 105 and playing time, 106 making the chance to
go professional contingent largely on the coach and institution. 107 Despite the
small likelihood of student-athletes going professional, 108 “coaches often
emphasize and encourage such dreams by promising starting positions and
playing time.” 109 After student-athletes commit to a program, coaches expect

(Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.usatodayeducate.com/staging/index.php/blog/college-athletes-suffer-thegreatest-injustice-from-ncaa.
100. Id. Jon Gissinger, former tight-end and a graduate from the University of Missouri, said
that “[a] football player is not going to get a job over someone who worked and had
internships . . . . My résumé right now is football.” Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Teicher, supra note 97. Nikki Thompson, a junior student-athlete at the University of
Hartford, said that “[a] lot of the athletes don't really think about [planning for the future] because
we're more focused on what we have to do now, day to day, rather than our financial situations after
school.” Id.
104. See Salgado, supra note 4, at 148.
105. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 344, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a one-year
limit to scholarships and a limit on scholarships per team . . . are not inherently or obviously
necessary for the preservation of amateurism, the student-athlete, or the general product of college
football,” but holding that plaintiffs failed to identify a relevant cognizable market for its antitrust
claim).
106. Salgado, supra note 4, at 146.
107. See id.
108. See supra Part II.D.
109. See Salgado, supra note 4, at 147.
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them to maintain eligibility, academic or otherwise, and submit to all coaching
demands. 110 If a student-athlete fails to do so, the athlete will lose eligibility
or be benched by the coach. 111
“While student-athletes can, in theory, walk away at any time,” returning
to minimum wage jobs or unemployment is not enticing in comparison to the
high risk-high reward prospect of professional play. 112 Often, the only option
is to stay in a program, hoping for the best.113 In addition, NCAA regulations
limit the student-athletes’ ability to leave one program for another.114 Further
underscoring an institution’s power over its student-athletes, an athletic
program director can cut a player from the program at his or her own
discretion and be “liable to fulfill only the remainder of the scholarship for the
year awarded.” 115
Member institutions’ willingness to partake in the lucrative athletic
endorsement field illustrates the “institutional commercial behavior that
generates cynicism on the part of student-athletes and thereby undermines
[from the inside] the amateurism and educational values professed to underlie
NCAA rules and regulations.” 116 This situation “fosters an environment in
which athletes might be more tempted than ever to accept money or
gifts . . . in violation of [NCAA] rules, or leave school well before their
scheduled graduation dates.” 117 In addition, the resulting “student-athlete
attitudes concerning those charged with enforcement responsibilities
significantly contribute to the devaluation of NCAA rules and the principles
on which they are premised.” 118 Meanwhile, the NCAA, employing 500 at its
national office in Indianapolis, Indiana, recorded nearly $872 million in

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 148.
113. Id.
114. Id. A Division I athlete transferring to another program generally has to sit out an entire
year. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 14.5.5.1.
115. Salgado, supra note 4, at 148–49; see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 344, 347 (7th
Cir. 2012) (upholding NCAA regulations capping athletic scholarships at one year following a lawsuit
on antitrust grounds by former Rice football player Joseph Agnew, who suffered injuries and lost his
athletic scholarship before his senior year, because he failed to properly identify a relevant market).
116. See Davis, Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure, supra note 41, at 214.
117. Id. at 215 (quoting Rob Zatechka, Outright Pay Is Not the Only Alternative, NCAA NEWS,
Aug 3, 1994, at 4–5).
118. Id. at 214, 216. In 2011, any University of Texas football player had a “fair market value”
of $513,922, and any Duke basketball player had a fair market value of $1,025,656. RAMOGI HUMA
& ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 16 (2012),
available at http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/The-Price-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-Sport.pdf.
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revenue for the 2011–2012 year. 119
As a result of the tension in the current situation, recent litigation directly
or indirectly involving the NCAA only underlines the problem. The causes of
action brought against the NCAA include: (1) declaring ineligible a studentathlete who had legal representation when meeting with representatives of
professional teams; 120 (2) capping the number and length of scholarships;121
(3) permanently disqualifying a student-athlete who was determined to have
received inappropriate tutoring assistance; 122 (4) forcing prospective studentathletes to relinquish all rights to their likenesses in order to be eligible to play
college sports; 123 and (5) requiring inconsistent academic standards from
transferring student-athletes based on their high school performance.124
A. Regulatory Inconsistencies
Current NCAA regulations generally do not distinguish between being
professional and entering into a draft.125 Following full-time collegiate
enrollment, “an individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the
individual asks to be placed on the draft list or supplemental draft list of a

119. The NCAA Budget: Where the Money Goes, supra note 42; Steve Berkowitz, NCAA had
Recorded $71 Million Surplus in Fiscal 2012, USATODAY.COM (May 2, 2013) http://www.usatoday.
com/story/sports/college/2013/05/02/ncaa-financial-statement-surplus/2128431/.
120. Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶¶ 9–13 (C.P.)
(vacated pursuant to settlement) (describing the relevant NCAA rules as “arbitrary.”); see infra Part
III.B.1.
121. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 344, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a one-year
limit to scholarships and a limit on scholarships per team . . . are not inherently or obviously
necessary for the preservation of amateurism, the student-athlete, or the general product of college
football” but holding that plaintiffs failed to identify a relevant cognizable market for its antitrust
claim).
122. McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013)
(holding that a collegiate football player who suffered NCAA sanctions but later signed with the
Baltimore Ravens did not have standing to sue the NCAA because the alleged injury to his football
career was too speculative, and because he signed a professional contract, he obtained the relief
sought, making his claim moot).
123. Russell v. NCAA, No. C 11–4938 CW, 2012 WL 1747496, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012)
(alleging that the NCAA, through its rules and forms, requires student-athletes to relinquish the
relevant rights in order to be eligible to participate in college basketball).
124. Davis v. NCAA, No. C 11–01207 WHA, 2011 WL 2531394, at *2, *4 (N.D. Cal. June 24,
2011) (holding that such differences survived a rational-basis review).
125. Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.01.1 (“Only an amateur student-athlete is
eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport.”), with id. art. 12.1.2(f) (“An
individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a
particular sport if the individual . . . [a]fter initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a
professional draft.”).
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professional league in that sport,” 126 even if the individual later requests to be
removed from the list prior to the actual draft, the individual is not drafted, or
“the individual is drafted but does not sign an agreement with” a professional
team. 127 This language highlights some of the major problems with the
NCAA regulations when viewed in light of the drafting methods of the various
professional leagues. While the NBA and NFL require student-athletes with
remaining collegiate eligibility to declare for the draft, MLB does not.128
Rather, if an individual meets MLB’s draft-eligibility rules, 129 the individual is
available for selection. 130 The MLB teams can draft any eligible player.131
Then, the player may choose to remain in college if he feels he was drafted too
low or if he simply wants to finish his collegiate career. 132 In sum, a studentathlete baseball player drafted by and negotiating with a professional team
remains an amateur under NCAA regulations, while his football counterpart
more or less loses his amateur status by merely declaring for the draft, without
either negotiations or the receipt of benefits. 133
While it would not be fair to baseball players if they could lose their
amateur status and remaining collegiate eligibility without any action on their
own, the fact that the NCAA allows baseball players to be drafted without
affecting their collegiate eligibility suggests that the NCAA makes unfair
distinctions based on particular sports.134 Collegiate baseball players may be
drafted and even negotiate for a professional contract without jeopardizing any
remaining collegiate eligibility, while football and basketball players put all
remaining eligibility at risk by entering the professional draft—regardless of
whether they enter professional negotiations or are represented when doing
so. 135 The difference arises from the fact that football and basketball players
decide whether they want to be in the draft, suggesting that the NCAA sees a
126. Id. art. 12.2.4.2 (emphasis added).
127. Id. Exceptions basically allow student-athletes to enter a draft once—as long as they are not
drafted and declare their intent to resume intercollegiate athletics shortly thereafter. See id. art.
12.2.4.2.3–12.2.4.2.4.
128. John Infante, Draft Rules Fail Basics of Amateurism, NCAA.ORG (Feb. 17, 2011), http://ww
w.ncaa .org/blog/2011/02/draft-rules-fail-basics-of-amateurism/.
129. See First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, supra note 61.
130. Infante, supra note 128.
131. Rosner, supra note 63.
132. Id.
133. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.2.4.2.
134. See id. art. 12.2.3.2 (“[A]n individual may compete on a tennis, golf, two-person sand
volleyball or two-person synchronized diving team with persons who are competing for cash or a
comparable prize, provided the individual does not receive payment of any kind for such
participation.”).
135. See id. art. 12.2.4.2.
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difference between a football player wishing to establish his market value by
entering the draft and a baseball player doing the same by actually negotiating
with a professional team. 136
B. Case Studies
1. Oliver’s Twist: Challenging the No-Agent Rule
In the fall of 2005, Andrew Oliver signed a letter of intent to attend
Oklahoma State University (OSU) to play baseball. 137 The following spring,
Oliver retained the services of Robert and Tim Baratta as sports advisors and
attorneys. 138 In June that year, the Minnesota Twins drafted Oliver and later
that summer, during a meeting with Oliver and his father—a meeting Tim
Baratta attended—the Twins offered Oliver $390,000 to sign. 139 After
consulting with his father, Oliver turned down the offer and decided to instead
pursue a collegiate career with OSU.140 Oliver played his first two years with
OSU before he decided to terminate the services of the Barattas and instead
retain a different advisor. 141
Following an unsuccessful attempt to reconnect with Oliver, the Barattas
sent Oliver an invoice for $113,750 for legal services. 142 Oliver claimed that
he had received no services or benefits from the Barattas and contacted an
attorney for assistance. 143 The Barattas then reported alleged bylaw violations
by Oliver to the NCAA, specifically referring to the meeting that Tim Baratta
attended. 144 As a result of the allegations, OSU found that Oliver had violated

136. Id. “Entering a draft and deciding any contract offered would not be worth leaving college
is no more or less an indication of a student-athlete’s intent to professionalize themselves than
deciding a contract offer is not sufficient to leave college and enter the draft in the first place.”
Infante, supra note 128.
137. Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 4 (C.P.)
(vacated pursuant to settlement).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 6.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶7; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.2.1. The Barattas promised to
protect Oliver’s amateur status. Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, ¶ 40. Despite this, Tim Baratta
insisted to be present during Oliver’s meeting with the Twins, but no testimony suggested that Baratta
did anything but merely observe during the meeting. Id. Under NCAA rules, “[a] lawyer may not be
present during discussions of a contract offer with a professional organization . . . . A lawyer’s
presence during such discussions is considered representation by an agent.” NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 15, art.12.3.2.1.
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the NCAA no-agent rule and suspended Oliver indefinitely. 145 After a
temporary restraining order reinstated Oliver, the NCAA suspended him for
one year and charged him a year of eligibility. 146 Oliver sued the NCAA and
requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.147
The court held that “[i]t [was] unquestionable that [the NCAA] and OSU’s
contractual agreement [was] created to confer a benefit in the studentathletes” 148 because the NCAA promises to “initiate, stimulate, and improve
intercollegiate athletic programs for student-athletes.” 149 As a student-athlete,
Oliver was an intended third-party beneficiary. 150 Because the parties to a
contract must act in good faith and fair dealing, “there must be in fact honesty
and reasonableness in the enforcement of the contract.” 151
The NCAA purports to allow student-athletes to retain a lawyer, but its
regulations prevent the lawyer from helping the student-athlete during contract
negotiations. 152 The court noted, “This surely does not retain a clear line of
demarcation between amateurism and professionalism. . ..[I]t allows for
exploitation of the student-athlete by ‘professional and commercial
enterprises’ in contravention of [the NCAA’s intention to protect the amateur
character of college athletics].”153 The court concluded that NCAA bylaw
12.3.2.1 was capricious and arbitrary before addressing what sort of relief
might be available to Oliver. 154
The court reviewed NCAA bylaw 19.7, 155 which imposes penalties on
student-athletes and institutions that rely on court orders that are later
overturned. 156 The court pointed out that, under this rule, educational
institutions face a dilemma: they can either play the student-athlete and risk
sanctions by the NCAA if the court order is later overturned, or they can try to
145. Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, ¶ 7.
146. Id. ¶ 8.
147. Id. ¶¶ 9–11.
148. Id. ¶ 27.
149. Id.
150. Id. ¶ 28.
151. Id. ¶ 30.
152. Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.2 (allowing student-athlete to retain
advice from lawyer concerning a professional contract), with id. art. 12.3.2.1 (prohibiting such lawyer
from being present during actual negotiations).
153. Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, ¶ 38. The court used an analogy to elaborate: “[This] is akin
to a patient hiring a doctor, but the doctor is told by the hospital board and the insurance company that
he cannot be present when the patient meets with a surgeon because the conference may improve his
patient’s decision-making power.” Id. ¶ 42.
154. Id.
155. Now Bylaw 19.13. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.13.
156. Id. art. 19.13.

SOEDERBAUM COMMENT FORMATTED FINAL

282

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

2/3/2014 11:00 AM

[Vol. 24:1

avoid future NCAA sanctions by not playing the student-athlete and instead
risk finding themselves in contempt of court.157 The court described the
regulation as “arbitrary and indeed a violation of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing . . . .” 158 Concluding that Oliver “would suffer loss of his
college baseball experience, impairment or loss of his future professional
baseball career, loss in being available for the upcoming draft, and ongoing
damage to [his] reputation and baseball career,” the court granted the
injunctive relief. 159
2. “Johnny Football”—A Hypothetical Case Study
For student-athletes, the only given is that their chosen schools may
benefit tremendously from their success.160 While Texas A&M may not use
Johnny Manziel’s name, likeness, or nickname, it “can make money off of
[him] by selling jerseys, T-shirts and hats with No. 2 on them.” 161 Even
before Manziel led A&M to victory against first-ranked Alabama in 2012,
unlicensed “Johnny Football” merchandise circulated.162 After the huge win,
the market exploded.163 When Manziel became the first freshman in history
to win the Heisman trophy, it exploded again. 164 Manziel generated $37
million in media exposure for Texas A&M during his first year playing. 165
As a result of Manziel’s “inject[ing] excitement and hope into the Aggies’

157. Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, ¶ 46.
158. Id. The court noted that the relevant NCAA bylaw was named “Restitution” and went on to
say that “[t]he old adage, that you can put lipstick on a pig, but it is still a pig, is quite relevant here.”
Id. ¶ 45.
159. Id. ¶¶ 59, 60. But see McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013) (holding that collegiate football player who suffered NCAA sanctions but later signed
with the Baltimore Ravens did not have standing to sue the NCAA because the alleged injury to his
football career was too speculative, and because he signed a professional contract, he obtained the
relief sought, making his claim moot).
160. See Davis, Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure, supra note 41, at 214–15.
161. Darren Rovell, Will Johnny Manziel Ever Cash in?, ESPN (Dec. 7, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://
espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/2547/will-johnny-manziel-ever-cash-in
[hereinafter
Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?].
162. Allen Reed, Manziel Mania Prompts Quarterback’s Family to Trademark ‘Johnny
Football,’ EAGLE, http://www.theeagle.com/news/local/article_85bb1ade-1e0e-5a26-a492-d1d598b
87e29.html (last updated Nov. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Reed, Manziel Mania Prompts Family to
Trademark]. “One seller on eBay who claims to be selling the original ‘Johnny Football’ shirt lists
that he's sold 625 of them.” Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161.
163. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161.
164. Id. (“The business surrounding his number, name and likeness went from a cottage industry
to a small economy.”).
165. Study, supra note 1.
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football program,” A&M’s football revenues will likely increase.166 During
the 2011–2012 academic year, “when [A&M was] still a member of the Big
12 [Conference], the Aggies generated $44.4 million in football revenues and
$79 million in overall athletic revenues.”167 The excitement generated by
Johnny Football, 168 combined with the greater expectations of what is to come
in his subsequent years in College Station, will likely boost (1) merchandise
sales; (2) ticket sales; (3) alumni donations; 169 (4) stadium advertising; (5)
athletic recruiting; and (6) A&M undergraduate applications.170
In February 2013, Manziel, through JMAN2 Enterprises, filed an
application with the United States Patent & Trademark Office seeking to
register “Johnny Football.” 171 With the trademark comes the responsibility
for policing the name, sending the cease-and-desist letters, and paying the
legal fees. 172 As long as Manziel plays college football, neither he nor his
family can make money from the trademark “Johnny Football,” as doing so
would endanger his collegiate eligibility. 173 But they can pay to protect it.174
166. Patrick Rishe, Johnny Football, Texas A&M, and Brand Penetration: The Power of One,
FORBES (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2012/11/28/johnny-football-texas-amand-brand-penetration-the-power-of-one/ [hereinafter Rishe, Brand Penetration].
167. Id.
168. Study, supra note 1.
169. See Allen Reed, Texas A&M Breaks Fundraising Record with $740 Million in Donations,
EAGLE, http://www.theeagle.com/news/local/article_82266d1a-11c0-543b-b75a-4c3613357abe.html
(last updated Sept. 17, 2013) (stating that between September 1, 2012, and August 31, 2013, Texas
A&M University took in nearly $300 million more in donations than any previous fiscal year and that
Johnny Manziel, the football program’s success, and the move to the SEC played significant part in
the increase). Texas A&M University’s football-related donations increased from $15.7 million to
$17.7 million in 2012 and are expected to increase to $18.6 million in 2013. George Schroeder, Why
Texas A&M Is ‘The Best It’s Ever Been,’ USATODAY.COM (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/sports/ncaaf/sec/2013/09/12/texas-am-rise-since-joining-sec/2805701/.
170. Patrick Rishe, Magnificent Johnny Manziel Is Money at Cotton Bowl, but HIS Money Is
Years Away, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2013/01/05/magnificent-john
ny-manziel-is-money-at-cotton-bowl-but-his-money-is-years-away/ [hereinafter Rishe, Money at
Cotton Bowl]. Boston College saw a “Flutie Effect” on their applications (30% increase) for two
years after Heisman winner Doug Flutie’s famous Hail Mary throw that secured the win against
Miami in 1984. Rishe, Brand Penetration, supra note 166; Dena Potter, ‘Flutie Effect’ Is Real, Study
Shows, SEATTLEPI.COM (Mar. 23, 2008), http://www.seattlepi.com/sports/article/Flutie-Effect-is-realstudy-shows-1268039.php. Texas A&M University saw a 10% increase in applications for 2013, but
the most noticeable effect occurred in the number of acceptances: more than 10,000 acceptances—as
compared to the estimated 8,700—led to the largest freshman class in school history. Schroeder,
supra note 169.
171. Darren Rovell, Suit Claims Nickname Infringement, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-foot
ball/story/_/id/8977054/lawsuit-filed-claims-johnny-football-infringement (last updated Feb. 23,
2013) [hereinafter Rovell, Nickname Infringement].
172. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161.
173. Reed, Manziel Mania Prompts Family to Trademark, supra note 162; Rovell, Manziel Ever
Cash in?, supra note 161. Under NCAA rules, “[a]n individual loses amateur status and thus shall
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For Manziel to fully capitalize on his own success, he cannot peak too
early, the players around him cannot drop in quality, and—most importantly—
he must avoid serious injuries. 175 Everyone except Manziel gains monetarily
now. 176 Even assuming that Manziel intends to declare for the draft as soon as
he is eligible to do so, he has to wait at least until May 2014 before an NFL
team can draft him and he can become a professional football player.177 If he,
for any of the above reasons, never has the opportunity to go professional, he
will never receive his share for making A&M’s football program bloom. 178
Of course, Manziel may choose to purchase “career-ending” insurance.179
Private insurers offer premiums ranging from $7,000 to $80,000 for $1 million
to $10 million of coverage, respectively, to insure student-athletes. 180 In
addition, the NCAA offers the Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability
Insurance program, with premiums ranging from $5,000 to $40,000 for
$500,000 to $5 million of coverage. 181 But, “[b]ecause career-ending injuries
are rare,. . .fewer than 10 [student-athletes] have received payouts in the
history of the program,” even though about 100 student-athletes participate

not be eligible for intercollegiate competition . . . if the individual . . . [u]ses his or her athletics skill
(directly or indirectly) for pay . . . .” NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2. “Pay” includes
“[a]ny direct or indirect salary, gratuity or comparable compensation.” Id. art. 12.1.2.1.1.
174. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161. In a pending suit against an individual
selling Johnny Football apparel, filed on February 15, 2013, JMAN2 Enterprises asks for injunctive
relief, compensatory damages, and exemplary damages. Complaint at 7, 21, JMAN2 Enters. L.L.C.
v. Vaughan, No. 6:13CV00158 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 582308, at *3.
175. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161; Mike Ozanian, Heisman Trophy Winner
Manziel Punished by NCAA and NFL, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mike
ozanian/2012/12/09/winning-heisman-trophy-winner-manziel-punished-by-ncaa-and-nfl/.
176. Rishe, Money at Cotton Bowl, supra note 170.
177. See Will Brinson, 2014 NFL Draft Date Set for May 8–10 at Radio City in New York,
CBSSPORTS.COM (May 28, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/22314468/2014-nfldraft-date-set-for-may-8-10-at-radio-city-in-new-york; National Football League Eligibility Rules,
supra note 52; Ozanian, supra note 175. But see Goodbread supra, note 1 and accompanying text
(stating that on January 8, 2014, Manziel made the choice to declare for the 2014 NFL draft and
forfeit the remaining two years of NCAA eligibility). However, while Manziel appear to reap his
rewards, other student-athletes are likely to find themselves trapped by the very same shortcomings of
the current regulations.
178. Ozanian, supra note 175. Forbes’ Patrick Rishe suggests that, at the very least “studentathletes who are largely responsible for spikes in licensing revenues at their school be allowed to earn
royalties with interest in a fund set aside for them to be redeemed upon graduation or departure from
the school, with the amount redeemed being conditional upon how close the student-athlete came to
completing their degree.” Rishe, Money at Cotton Bowl, supra note 170.
179. Gary Klein, USC’s Matt Barkley Weighs Costs, Benefits of Injury Insurance, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 23, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/23/sports/la-sp-nfl-insurance-20111224.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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annually. 182 If Manziel suffers a severe injury that is not career-ending183 but
that leaves him a different player after recovering, he would fall between the
coverage gaps and be out of luck. 184 In addition, even a $10 million policy
fades compared to the $50 million Sam Bradford secured following the 2010
NFL draft. 185 If Manziel is injured and loses the opportunity to write the
professional chapter 186 in the Johnny Football story, the collusive NCAA and
NFL rules will have deprived him of considerable opportunities.187
D. Perspective: A Global View on Amateurism
1. International Regulatory Bodies
Many global regulatory bodies have successfully drawn clear lines
between “amateur” and “professional” without financially penalizing the
athletes that play their sports. According to Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA), the controlling body of the world’s most popular
sport, soccer, 188 “[a] professional is a player who has a written contract with a
club and is paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he
effectively incurs. All other players are considered to be amateurs.”189
Similarly, according to the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF), “[a]
professional player shall be an ice hockey player who is paid more for his ice
hockey player activity than the expenses he directly incurs through playing ice

182. Id. (noting that true career-ending injuries are rare).
183. See id.
184. University of Oklahoma quarterback Jason White won the Heisman trophy—after having
gone through reconstructive surgery on each knee. Associated Press, Ex-Sooners’ QB Says Knees
Won’t Let Him Play, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2131507 (last updated Aug.
11, 2005) [hereinafter Associated Press, Ex-Sooner’s Knees Won’t Let Him Play]. Following his
injuries, White went undrafted despite his extensive college achievements and was competing for
third quarterback with the Tennessee Titans. Id. While with the Titans, White felt that his knees did
not allow him to chase the dream of playing professionally and decided to retire. Id.
185. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161. Two other Heisman-winners, Tim Tebow
and Matt Leinart, have already made more than $13 million and $23 million, respectively. Id.
186. As compared to professional golfer Michelle Wie, who forfeited her NCAA eligibility by
going professional and made close to $20 million in endorsements in 2006 alone. Doug Ferguson,
Michelle Wie Accepted to Stanford, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/19/AR2006121901240_pf.html.
187. Ozanian, supra note 175. It seems foreseeable that student-athletes placed in this situation
are more tempted to violate NCAA rules by accepting benefits, especially those student-athletes who
are unlikely to go professional and who want to get their money while they can. See supra Part II.D.
188. ERIC DUNNING, SPORT MATTERS: SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SPORT, VIOLENCE AND
CIVILISATION 103 (1999) (“During the twentieth century, soccer emerged as the world's most popular
team sport.”).
189. FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS art. 2, ¶ 2 (2012).
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hockey. All other players are considered non-professionals . . . .” 190
The governing bodies of predominantly individual sports have taken a
similar, if more financially restrictive, approach. The International Boxing
Association (AIBA) renders ineligible for competition “[a]ny Boxer who
enters into a contract, memorandum of understanding, pre-agreement or any
other form of agreement, with an entity or individual other than AIBA . . .,
related to such Boxer’s future participation in professional boxing or any other
professional individual physical contact sport than boxing . . . .”191
The Royal and Ancient Gold Club of St. Andrews (R&A) and United
States Golf Association (USGA) regulate golf. 192 Under R&A regulations,
“an amateur golfer of golf skill or reputation must not use that skill or
reputation for any financial gain.”193 Further, “[a]n amateur golfer must not
play golf for prize money or its equivalent in a match, competition or
exhibition.” 194 The R&A and the USGA explicitly allow amateur golfers to
enter into agreements with professional agents, provided that
the contract or agreement is solely in relation to the golfer’s
future as a professional golfer and does not stipulate playing
in certain . . . events as an amateur golfer, and
. . . the amateur golfer does not obtain payment, compensation
or any financial gain, directly or indirectly, whilst still an
amateur golfer. 195
Further, the Rules state that “[a]n amateur golfer may enquire as to his
likely prospects as a professional golfer, including applying unsuccessfully for
the position of a professional golfer . . . .”196 Finally, provided that the golfer,
in writing and before playing, waives all rights to any prize money, an amateur
golfer may—without risking amateur status—enter and compete in any
qualifying competitions required to be eligible for membership of a
professional tour. 197

190. 2013 IIHF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER REGULATIONS § II (2012).
191. AIBA OPEN BOXING COMPETITION RULES § 2.3.2 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
192. The R&A, RANDA.ORG, http://www.randa.org/en/RandA.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
193. R&A, RULES OF GOLF AND THE RULES OF AMATEUR STATUS 2012–2015 r. 6-1 (32nd ed.
2011) [hereinafter RULES OF GOLF AND THE RULES OF AMATEUR STATUS 2012–2015] (emphasis
omitted).
194. Id. r. 3-1 (emphasis omitted).
195. Id. r. 2-2(b) (emphasis omitted).
196. Id. r. 2-1, n.1 (emphasis omitted).
197. Id. r. 2-1, n.2.
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2. The Olympic Games
Jim Thorpe, winning two gold medals in the 1912 Olympics, was stripped
of his medals because he in the summer of 1910 had played semi-professional
baseball for $2.00 a game. 198 In 1955, Avery Brundage, President of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), expressed his firm support for
amateurism: “We can only rely on the support of those who believe in the
principles of fair play and sportsmanship embodied in the amateur code in our
efforts to prevent the Games from being used by individuals, organizations or
nations for ulterior motives.” 199 But it was widely suspected that many
Olympic athletes were in fact professionals, supported by their governments to
train and compete. 200 By the end of the 1980s, the movement away from
amateurism had gained substantial support 201 and, in 1991, the IOC eliminated
the requirement that all participating athletes of the Olympic Games must be
amateurs. 202
Opening the door for professional athletes had no adverse effect on
interest in the Olympic Games; rather, it turned the Games into a multi-billion
dollar enterprise. 203 Between 1988 and 2010, the broadcasting revenue
generated by the games increased from $402.6 million to $1.74 billion for the
summer games, and from $324.9 million to $1.28 billion for the winter
games. 204 In addition, the overall revenue generated by the various Olympic
programs increased from a total of $2.63 billion in 1993–1996 to $5.45 billion
in 2005–2008. 205 By departing from its long-held strict view on amateurism,

198. Earl Gustkey, Bones of Contention: Children of Jim Thorpe Want Namesake Town in
Pennsylvania to Return Their Father’s Remains for Indian Burial in Oklahoma, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16,
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/16/sports/sp-26220. The medals were reinstated in
1983—30 years after Thorpe’s death. Id.
199. Bob Greene, What Changed the Olympics Forever, CNN.COM (July 23, 2012), http://www.
cnn.com/2012/07/22/opinion/greene-olympics-amateurs.
200. Id. Other Olympians were paid under the table. Jeré Longman, Juan Antonio Samaranch,
Who Transformed the Olympics, Dies at 89, NYTIMES.COM (April 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/04/22/sports/22samaranch.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
201. Greene, supra note 199.
202. Compare OLYMPIC CHARTER 44 (1990) (“All competitors . . . may participate in the
Olympic Games, except those who have . . . been registered as professional athletes or professional
coaches in any sport[,] . . . signed a contract as a professional athlete or professional coach in any
sport before the official closing of the Olympic Games[,] . . . [or] accepted . . . material advantages for
their preparation or participation in sports competition . . . .”), with OLYMPIC CHARTER 44 (1991)
(leaving it to each international sports association to establish its own criteria for eligibility, as long as
such criteria conforms to the Olympic Charter).
203. Longman, supra note 200.
204. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE 26 (2012),
205. Id. at 6.
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the Games have increased in popularity while reducing the very problem
currently faced by student-athletes with regard to lack of choice and
potentially career-destroying injuries before profitability. 206
IV. DESIGNING A SOLUTION: BRIGHT-LINE RULES
While the federal and state governments and the NCAA may state similar
goals with regard to protecting student-athletes, the existing legislation and
regulations do more harm than good.207 Government regulations focus on
Meanwhile, the NCAA appears
protecting educational institutions. 208
primarily concerned with protecting its financial stronghold through its
concept of amateurism, 209 ironically creating the very situation that requires
government involvement to provide remedies for the educational
institutions. 210 And because each body has its own set of regulations
pertaining to the agent-athlete relationship, 211 these complicate the problem
instead of solving it and do little to actually protect student-athletes. 212
A. Draw a Consistent Line Between “Amateur” and “Professional”
A bright line between “amateur” and “professional” is accepted
worldwide, but not by the NCAA. 213 NCAA’s own regulations make it clear
206. See generally INTERIM REPORT TO THE 114TH IOC SESSION, OLYMPIC GAMES STUDY
COMMISSION 2 (Nov. 2002) (“The Olympic Games, particularly over the last 20 years, have
experienced unparalleled growth and universal popularity. . . . Olympic spectators and cumulative
television audiences for the Summer Games have increased 112% and 117% respectively in the
twelve years from Seoul in 1988.”); see also Adam Taylor, Here’s How Much Olympic Athletes
Really Get Paid, BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-mucholympic-athletes-really-get-paid-2012-7 (noting that while the IOC does not pay the Olympic athletes,
successful Olympians may reap revenue from various sources).
207. See Payne, supra note 18, at 691.
208. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Parts II.A.–B.
210. See supra Part II.C.2.
211. See supra Part III.A.
212. Payne, supra note 18, at 691–92. On September 21, 2013, several NCAA football players
had the letter combination “APU” (All Players United) written on their gear during their games to
advocate for NCAA reform. Associated Press, All Players United: College Football Players Show
Solidarity with Letters ‘APU,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/09/21/all-players-united-ncaa-college-football-players-apu_n_3968876.html?view=screen. The
campaign was launched by the National College Players Association, a student-athlete advocacy
group founded by former UCLA football player Ramogi Huma with the goal of uniting studentathletes to push for improved conditions. Id. An in-depth analysis of the player movement is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
213. Compare AIBA OPEN BOXING COMPETITION RULES, supra note 191, and 2013
INTERNATIONAL IIHF TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 190, and FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE
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that being drafted is not the same as giving up amateur status. 214 Nothing
supports the conclusion that a football player who declares himself available
for the draft is less of an amateur than a baseball player actually drafted—or a
golfer who plays in a professional competition but waives any prize money. 215
By adding the prohibitions regarding drafts and agents, 216 the NCAA has
created arbitrary inconsistencies between sports. Instead, the NCAA should
redraw the bright line between “amateur” and “professional” at entering into
an agreement with or receiving benefits from a professional team, 217 not when
a player is drafted, enters into a draft, or signs with an agent. 218 The biggest
athletic event in the world, the Olympic Games, departed from strict amateur
restrictions only to see the Games grow even more popular. 219 The NCAA
does not even have to take it that far; it only has to remove its arbitrary
restraints that do not protect its principle of amateurism.
B. Let Student-Athletes into the Professional Leagues
The professional leagues, such as the NFL, should change their rules to
allow student-athletes to sign with professional teams. Despite not satisfying
the current eligibility requirements to actually play in the NFL, promising

STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS, supra note 189, and RULES OF GOLF AND THE RULES OF
AMATEUR STATUS 2012–2015, supra note 193, with NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2. See
also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art 12.02.8(a) (“A professional team is any organized team
that . . . [p]rovides any of its players more than actual and necessary expenses for participation on the
team, except as otherwise permitted by NCAA legislation.”). Before its 2013 amendments, the
NCAA bylaws defined a professional athlete as an “athlete . . . who receives any kind of payment,
directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as permitted by the governing legislation of the
Association.” 2008–09 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.02.3. This definition was omitted in the
2013 version, but a student-athlete still loses his or her amateur status for various reasons unrelated to
payment and, consequently, must gain either professional or some intermediate status that, at best,
blurs the line between “amateur” and “professional.” See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2;
see also Christian Dennie, Changing the Game: The Litigation That May Be the Catalyst for Change
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 49–50 (2012) (“By and through the evolution
of intercollegiate athletics, student-athletes as a class fall somewhere between a professional athlete
and an amateur, i.e., someone competing as an avocation.”).
214. See supra Part III.A.
215. See Infante, supra note 128.
216. See Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 36 (C.P.)
(vacated pursuant to settlement).
217. As a starting point, any team that, including through a third party, provides payment beyond
necessary expenses for athletic abilities would have to be considered a “professional team.” See
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.02.4.
218. The NCAA has already drawn this line. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2(c)–(e).
But see id. art. 12.1.2(f)–(g) (eliminating a student-athlete’s eligibility for entering a professional draft
or entering into an agreement with an agent).
219. See supra Part III.C.2.
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student-athletes could benefit from having the opportunity to choose to make
the move to professional sports, train with professional athletes under the
supervision of professional coaches, and make some money while doing
so 220—without risk of losing market leverage or suffering a career-ending
injury in college. 221
C. The Missing Party: The Professional Sports Team
Without professional sports, there would be no professional athletes, and
consequently, an amateur player would never risk losing his or her amateur
status. Current legislation and regulations focus on the student-athlete, its
institution, and any athlete agent who represents the student-athlete—
representation that would be irrelevant if the student-athlete does not intend to
go professional or otherwise profit from his or her sport. But they largely
ignore the fact that without the professional team, the student-athlete can never
become a professional athlete. Rather, student-athletes risk finding themselves
in a gray zone in which they are neither amateurs nor professionals.222 For
any legislation to be truly effective, it must not only consider but also directly
include the professional teams. 223
D. Checks-and-Balances: Duties and Consequences of Breach
The student-athletes, agents, institutions, and professional teams all need
to be regulated and protected from each other.224 With the focus of the
legislative restrictions on institutions and agents, student-athletes are not afraid
to abuse the system, i.e., by entering into contracts they know the agent will
not be able to enforce under the UAAA or by accepting benefits from an agent
who has more to lose than the player. 225 The legislation currently in place is
unbalanced and imposes upon student-athletes and agents disproportionate
restrictions and unrealistic consequences 226 for violations but fails to similarly
220. See NFL CBA, supra note 55, art. 33, § 1(a) (allowing NFL teams to maintain a practice
squad).
221. See Travis, supra note 2.
222. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
223. Several scholars have expressed concern over the fact that UAAA and SPARTA do not
sufficiently regulate the agent-professional player relationship, and others have suggested that
professional teams must educate student-athletes. See Glenn M. Wong et al., Going Pro in Sports:
Providing Guidance to Student-Athletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553, 605–06 (2011). That discussion is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
224. See supra Parts II.C, III.
225. See United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993).
226. See supra Parts II.C.2, III.A.
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impose responsibilities on the professional teams. 227
Student-athletes and agents already have a duty to report any
communication between them to the student-athlete’s educational
institution. 228 The purpose of this requirement is to protect the institutions
from unknowingly violating NCAA regulations and the often severe
consequences for doing so. 229 But the purpose can be even better served if the
NCAA amends its definition of “amateur” to allow the student-athletes to
retain their amateur status without risking their eligibility until they actually
sign with a professional team, 230 accompanied by a parallel amendment to the
legislation that requires every professional team to inform a student-athlete’s
institution about the contact with a student-athlete before entering into any
form of negotiation of a contract or providing any form of benefit.231 The
institution will then be responsible to communicate with the NCAA and
ultimately make sure that no NCAA violations take place, a duty that fits well
within the already severe scheme of regulations imposed on the institutions for
violations. 232
Placing this responsibility on the professional team makes sense because
they can easily satisfy the duty by contacting the institution and—as in many
cases, such as those involving the NBA and the NFL—the professional league
has restrictions in place to prevent promising athletes from going professional
until certain minimum conditions are satisfied, while exposing promising
athletes like Johnny Manziel and Tyrone Prothro to a prolonged risk of being
injured in college and missed opportunities to capitalize on their success.233
Under this approach, NCAA would still be able to sanction an NCAA
institution for playing a student-athlete who has entered into negotiations with
or received benefits from a professional team regardless of whether the
institution received notice from the professional team. 234
227. See Sports Agency Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) 15 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012);
UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 11 (2000).
228. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 11.
229. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.9.5–19.9.7; see also Reggie Bush to Forfeit
Heisman, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5572827 (last updated
Sept. 15, 2010) (describing the severe sanctions the NCAA passed down on USC after Reggie Bush
had accepted improper benefits while playing for the institution).
230. See Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶¶ 38–41
(C.P.) (vacated pursuant to settlement).
231. Such duty can be modeled after current SPARTA notice obligations for student-athletes and
agents. See 15 U.S.C. § 7805(a).
232. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.9.5–19.9.8.
233. See Associated Press, Ex-Sooner’s Knees Won’t Let Him Play, supra note 184.
234. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2 (loss of amateur status and, consequently,
eligibility); id. art. 14.01.1 (“An institution shall not permit a student-athlete to represent it in
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But while the risk of NCAA sanctions remains, the codification of
applicable negligence standards could cause the financial consequences to
differ significantly. In Texas, for example, negligence consists of three
elements: (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach of that legal duty; and (3) damages
proximately caused by that breach.235
Codifying the professional team’s duty to communicate any studentathlete contact to the student-athlete’s educational institution establishes the
first element. If the professional team fails to properly communicate with the
institution, it satisfies the second element. And if the unknowing institution
plays the student-athlete and consequently is subject to NCAA sanctions,
damages resulting from the breach, and the institution can recover its financial
losses from the professional team. 236 Of course, this cause of action rests on
the premise that the institution did not receive reliable information regarding
the student-athlete’s potential eligibility issue from any other source, including
the student-athlete and the agent, because such notice would negate the
causation element. 237 However, the simultaneous failure of the agent and the
student-athlete to communicate the professional negotiations to the institution
should not be considered an independent cause that relieves the professional
team from liability. 238 Rather, considering the agent and student-athlete’s
failure to provide adequate information to the institution foreseeable by the
professional team would render such failure irrelevant in determining the
team’s potential liability. 239
intercollegiate athletics competition unless the student-athlete meets all applicable eligibility
requirements, and the institution has certified the student-athlete’s eligibility.”); id. art. 19.9.5–19.9.8
(NCAA may penalize institutions for playing ineligible student-athletes).
235. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990) (“The plaintiff
must establish both the existence and the violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant to
establish liability in tort. Moreover, the existence of duty is a question of law for the court to decide
from the facts surrounding the occurrence in question.” (citation omitted)).
236. The professional team can likely afford to indemnify the institution. See Sports Industry
Overview, supra note 50 and accompanying text. Besides, all the professional team would have to do
to avoid facing liability is to provide notice to the institution before providing any benefit to, or
entering into negotiations with, the athlete.
237. See Lesieur v. Fryar, 325 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. App. 2010) (holding that “despite the
slight variations in the technical terminology used by the two inspectors in the reports, the
information provided . . . afforded [Lesieur] the same level of warning . . .”).
238. See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. 2006) (“A new and
independent cause is one that intervenes between the original wrong and the final injury such that the
injury is attributed to the new cause rather than the first and more remote cause.”).
239. Id. at 451 (quoting SALES AND EDGAR § 1.04[4][b] at 1–55 (“‘Generally speaking, if the
intervening force was foreseeable at the time of the defendant's negligence, the force is considered to
be a ‘concurring cause’ of the plaintiff's injuries,’ and ‘the defendant remains liable for the original
negligence.’”)); see also J. Wigglesworth Co. v. Peeples, 985 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[I]f an intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant in the exercise of ordinary
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Tasking professional teams with the duty to report contact with studentathletes to their institutions does not mean relieving the student-athlete or any
agent of the student athlete of the same duty. 240 An agent who fails to provide
notice should face a fine or suspension and, repeated violations should cause
the agent to be stripped of the right to represent athletes in any capacity. 241 A
student-athlete in violation of these rules should face consequences particular
to the student-athlete’s situation, such as suspension from playing at the
professional level, 242 based on the premise that an athlete does not become
professional until having received a benefit or entered into a contract with a
professional team. 243 And if a student-athlete’s conduct causes the unknowing
represented institution to suffer negative consequences, it is only fair to not
allow the student-athlete to benefit therefrom—by affecting his or her
eligibility to play professionally. 244
A system with this structure would not only equitably distribute the
responsibility between the major parties involved in a student-athlete’s
transition from collegiate to professional sports but also place reasonable
consequences of violations with each party based on the particular party’s
interests and ability to perform. 245
Of course, for this system to work well, the NCAA must recognize that
hiring agents is clearly distinguishable from receiving benefits for athletic
abilities,246 and the professional leagues must be willing to at least allow
student-athletes to sign on a practice-squad basis. 247 The rules that are in
place to protect Johnny Manziel 248 allow him to trademark “Johnny

care, it cannot be considered a new and independent cause”).
240. See Sports Agency Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
241. See Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 551, 581–82 (2011); see also Willenbacher, supra note 74, at 1250 (suggesting that agents
should risk being stripped of their right to represent athletes and lose the right to contracts already
entered in to with athletes).
242. See Glenn M. Wong et al., supra note 223, at 606.
243. See Moore, supra note 13, at 555.
244. Id. at 554–55. This is intended only as a worst-case scenario and should not be interpreted
to mean that any student-athlete found in violation of any NCAA rule causing negative consequences
to the represented institution should lose the chance to play professionally.
245. See supra Parts II.C.2, III.A.
246. See Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶¶ 38–41
(C.P.) (vacated pursuant to settlement).
247. See NFL CBA, supra note 55, art. 33, § 1(a).
248. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, 369 F.3d 124, 125–26
(2nd Cir. 2004); see also National Football League Eligibility Rules, supra note 52; NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 15, art. 12.1.2(f).
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Football” 249 but restrict him from entering the draft. Tyrone Prothro was a
college star with an extremely bright future.250 A gruesome injury, exactly
what the NFL states that it wants to protect the young players from, cost him
his chance to play professionally, and all he did was play by the rules that
were supposed to protect him. 251
V. CONCLUSION
The NCAA must acknowledge that its arbitrary line between “amateur”
and “professional” does little but protect its own moneymaking machine. A
bright line should be drawn in the only place where it makes sense: an athlete
does not become professional until he or she signs a professional contract or
receives such benefits. The professional leagues must open their doors for
athletes to actually sign with the teams, even if they are not eligible to actually
play in the league yet. Each major party involved in a student-athlete’s
transition from college to professional sports—the athlete, the agent, the
NCAA institution, and the professional team—must all take on the appropriate
duty and face proportionate consequences for any violations.
Strict
restrictions on the agents alone work only as a Band-Aid to cover the
underlying issue: a system skewed heavily in favor of the NCAA and its
member institutions. A proper checks-and-balances system holds everyone
accountable but also offers appropriate protection.
The regulatory scheme should not focus on severely punishing those who
violate the rules but rather helping the involved parties to abide by them. By
placing appropriate duties on each party involved—including the professional
teams—severe sanctions would only fall on those truly deserving punishment.
Along with a bright line between the NCAA definitions of “amateur” and
“professional,” this system would provide incentives for all of the involved
parties to play by the rules, making enforcement much easier and giving
Johnny Football and his fellow student-athletes a better position from which to
make a decision based on what is best for them individually—and not for the
NCAA or the professional teams.

249. Rovell, Nickname Infringement, supra note 171.
250. See Travis, supra note 2.
251. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 1.2–1.3, 2.9.

